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This thesis examines the nature of the alliance formed between President Rafael Correa 
and the Ecuadorian indigenous movement that led to the incorporation of plurinationalism into 
the 2008 Constitution. To this end, this analysis frames the push for a new constitution that 
occurred between 2006 and 2008 within the larger historical relationship between the indigenous 
movement and the Ecuadorian presidency. The trajectory of this this relationship reveals how the 
indigenous movement’s extensive experience with presidential politics made it skeptical of 
Rafael Correa’s promises, and consequently ended the possibility of an electoral coalition with 
him in 2006. It also brings to light how the three presidential overthrows between 1997 and 2005 
forced President Correa into a mutualistic relationship with the indigenous movement in order to 
stabilize the nation and secure his tenure as president. By analyzing the political climate between 
2006 and 2008 as a product of its history, this thesis accurately presents the Correa-indigenous 







On April 24, 1992, over ten thousand indigenous people marched from the Amazon to 
Quito, Ecuador. After entering the heart of Ecuadorian society, the marchers congregated in 
the city’s historic plaza to petition the government. With the eyes of the nation upon them, the 
indigenous people from the Amazon demanded a constitutional reform to transform Ecuador 
into a plurinational state. This mass exodus, which is now famously known as the Caminata 
(the Walk), began the road to plurinationalism in Ecuador.  
After fifteen years of unwavering advocacy, the indigenous movement succeeded in 
officially transforming Ecuador into a plurinational state with the ratification of the 2008 
Constitution. The progressive nature of the nation’s charter garnered this watershed moment 
international appraisal. In celebratory spirit, the newly elected Ecuadorian president Rafael 
Vicente Correa proclaimed that a new nation had been born.1 Eight years have elapsed since this 
South American country etched plurinationalism into its constitution, and despite the optimism 
this generated, the concrete effects have been virtually nonexistent. The agrarian and economic 
policies of the Correa administration, which favor large-scale economic development, isolate 
and marginalize the indigenous sector of the Ecuadorian nation.2 State-led developmental 
projects, especially extraction endeavors, continue to strip indigenous communities of their 
rights to protected land.3 Finally, plurinationalism remains an undefined constitutional concept.4  
                                                 
1. Marc Becker, "Correa, Indigenous Movements, and the Writing of a New Constitution in Ecuador," Latin 
American Perspectives 38, no. 1 (2011): 47. 
2. "Building a Plurinational Ecuador: Complications and Contradictions," Socialism and Democracy 26, no. 3 
(2011): 72. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Georgetown University, "Republic of Ecuador Constituion of 2008,"  
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html. 
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The unfulfilled promises of the 2008 Constitution have transformed this once momentous 
indigenous victory into a tale of the government successfully deceiving the indigenous masses. 
This essay aims to rectify this narrative by presenting the constitutional incorporation of 
plurinationalism in its intricate reality.  
 
Literature Review 
The ratification of the 2008 Constitution birthed a body of academic literature that has 
provided profound insight into the Ecuadorian indigenous movement and plurinationalism. 
However, the current works available to us do not apply a broader historical lens to this specific 
moment. For example, in “Correa, Indigenous Movements, and the Writing of a New 
Constitution in Ecuador” Marc Becker presents a narration of the events that occurred between 
2006 and 2008 that led to the formation of a new constitution.5 Although this analysis enables 
us to understand how the constitutional incorporation of plurinationalism unfolded, it does not 
answer why it happened during this particular period. By failing to contextualize the 2008 
Constitution within the broader historical relationship between the indigenous movement and 
the Ecuadorian presidency, this analysis, and the current body of literature at large, present an 
incomplete story of this realigning moment.  
 The absence of a broader historical framework and the shortcomings of the 2008 
Constitution have also produced a narrative of manipulation. Andres Ortiz presents this 
perspective in “Taking Control of the Public Sphere by Manipulating Civil Society: The Citizen 
Revolution.” In this work, Ortiz argues that Rafael Correa secured his presidency by successfully 
manipulating the indigenous citizenry, Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas (CONAIE), 
                                                 
5. Becker, "Correa, Indigenous Movements, and the Writing of a New Constitution in Ecuador," 47-62. 
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and Pachakutik with the promise to transform Ecuador into a plurinational state.6  Academic 
discourses like this trivialize the political savviness of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement and 
ignore the complex historical factors that produced this watershed moment. More specifically, 
this work fails to account how the political climate produced by a decade of presidential 
overthrows caused this phenomenon to occur by uniting two forces with different agendas.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
This thesis reveals the mutualistic nature of the Correa-indigenous alliance by framing 
the push for a new constitution within the larger historical relationship between the indigenous 
movement and the Ecuadorian presidency. The trajectory of this relationship reveals how the 
three presidential overthrows between 1997 and 2005 forced President Correa into an electoral 
alliance with the indigenous movement in order to stabilize the nation and secure his tenure as 
president. It also sheds light to how the indigenous movement’s partnership with Lucio Gutiérrez 
placed it in marginal political position during the 2006 presidential election and the 2007 
Constitutional Assembly. In recognition of these realities, this thesis argues that the previous 
decade of presidential overthrows produced a political climate defined by instability that forged a 
mutualistic relationship between Rafael Correa and the indigenous movement during the push for 
a new constitution.   
                                                 
6. Andres Ortiz, "Taking Control of the Public Sphere by Manipulating Civil Society: The Citizen Revolution," 
European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, no. 98 (2015): 29-48. In English CONAIE stands for 
the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities in Ecuador. This is an umbrella organization of indigenous 
communities that primarily reside in the Amazon. Pachakutik is a political faction created by CONAIE. In this 
thesis, the indigenous movement refers to these two organizations.  
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CHAPTER I 
THE INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT AND THE PRESIDENCY 
 
The three presidential overthrows that occurred between 1997 and 2005 paved the road to 
plurinationalism by destabilizing the Ecuadorian government and producing an indigenous 
movement with extensive experience in presidential politics. Throughout this period, the 
movement played defining roles in the presidencies of Abdalá Bucaram, Jamil Mahuad, and 
Lucio Gutiérrez. This intimate relationship enabled the indigenous leaders to gain a profound 
understanding of presidential politics, and in the process, propelled Ecuador into chaos.  
After the Caminata placed plurinationalism at the forefront of Ecuadorian politics, 
CONAIE created the El Movimiento de la Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik-Nuevo Paìz (The 
Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement) in 1996. The stated purpose of this political faction 
was to realize the principles of plurinationalism by making Ecuador’s governmental institutions 
more democratic and diverse.7  The indigenous movement’s entrance into formal politics did 
not end its grassroots efforts; rather, it created a political arm that worked in conjunction with 
active street movements to bring about change. This duality of external and internal forces made 
CONAIE and Pachakutik key players in the overthrows of presidents Abdalá Bucaram and 
Jamil Mahuad.  
The indigenous movement first started directly influencing the presidency during 
Abdalá Bucaram’s time in office. Between 1996 and 1998, Pachakutik made quantum leaps in 
embedding itself into the political system. In the 1996 presidential election, the new faction 
                                                 
7. Flavia Freidenberg and Manuel  Alcantara Saez, "Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik – Nuevo País," 
Flasco Andes  (1999): 239. 
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secured 20.6 percent of the national vote and sixty governmental appointments. Additionally, 
in the 1997 constituent election, Pachakutik earned ten percent of the seats.8 This permitted 
the political organization to incorporate the demands of indigenous people into the 1998 
Constitutional Assembly. Outside of the convention, Pachakutik negotiated with other 
political parties to make CONAIE leader Nina Pacari the vice-president of the legislature.9 
The indigenous movement’s ability to establish itself politically enabled it to play a leading 
role in the overthrow of Abdalá Buccaram.  
President Bucaram’s time in office was characterized by corruption and his clash with 
the indigenous movement. During his presidency, he set in place a spoils system that secured 
his family and friends governmental positions. The indigenous movement’s relentless critiques 
of the administration led to President Bucaram bribing Pachakutik leaders for their support.10 
CONAIE responded by joining forces with labor organizations in order to stage massive 
protests on the streets of Quito. The resistance grew when President Bucaram unveiled his 
economic plan to increase the prices for electricity and gas, reform labor relations, and 
establish a timetable to dollarize the Ecuadorian currency.11 This transformed the ongoing 
street manifestations into a powerful movement to remove President Abdalá Buccaram from 
office. Inside the legislature, Pachakutik formed a coalition with other political parties to 
increase pressure on the president. On February 1997, Abdalá Bucaram yielded to the external 
and internal forces that demanded his removal and his presidency ended. 
                                                 
8. Ibid. 
9. Ibid., 241. 
10. Leon Zamosc, "The Indian Movement and Political Democracy in Ecuador," Latin American Politics and 
Society 49, no. 3 (2007): 11. 
11. Ibid. 
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The decade of instability continued with the Presidency of Jamil Mahuad. Immediately 
after Mahuad assumed office in 1998, the country fell into a debilitating economic crisis. In an 
effort to ameliorate the situation, President Mahuad announced his plan to dollarize the 
Ecuadorian economy and implement the austerity measures demanded by the International 
Monetary Fund. This caused indigenous activists under the leadership of CONAIE president 
Antonio Vargas to unify with military forces and advocate for yet another presidential 
overthrow.12 On January 21, 2000, with a crowd protesting in Congress, the presidency of 
Mahuad officially ended. 
 The indigenous movement’s direct role in overthrowing presidents Buccaram and 
Mahuad cemented a direct relationship between the Ecuadorian presidency and the movement. 
This relationship also propelled Ecuador into a state of political instability, as the country 
suffered two consecutive presidential overthrows. Although, uncertainty loomed over the 
highest office in the nation, at the start of the twentieth century, the indigenous movement was a 
potent political force in Ecuadorian politics. This changed in the years that followed.  
In 2003, the indigenous movement formed an electoral coalition with Lucio Gutiérrez to 
secure the presidency. The successful election of Gutiérrez continued the decade of presidential 
instability when he abandoned his populist discourse in favor of austerity measures. However, 
this time the indigenous movement did not escape the controversy that plagued the presidency. 
In an effort to eliminate the nation’s fiscal deficit, which inhibited the development of social 
projects that benefited indigenous sectors, the Pachakutik members in Gutiérrez’s cabinet were 
complicit in the implementation of austerity measures.13 These measures included raising the 
prices for fuel, transportation and electricity, and a salary freeze in the public sector. In 
                                                 
12. Ibid., 12. 
13. Ibid., 15. 
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response, CONAIE leaders publicly condemned the neoliberal policies of the president they 
helped elect. The indigenous-Gutiérrez alliance officially ended when Pachakutik refused to 
support a bill that modified labor contracts in the public sector, and the president consequently 
dismissed all Pachakutik ministers from the government.14 Although the coalition between the 
movement and President Gutierrez disbanded, the indigenous movement’s internal divisions 
continued to linger. 
The failed alliance with Gutiérrez created an irreparable rift within the indigenous 
movement that curtailed its political influence. After CONAIE and Pachakutik abandoned the 
coalition, indigenous activists reproached the organizations for leaving while others 
condemned them for staying too long.15 These internal conflicts were further exasperated 
when President Gutiérrez appointed Antonio Vargas, a former CONAIE member, as the 
minister of social welfare in exchange for his allegiance.16 Antonio Vargas’s appointment won 
the loyalty of a major sector of the indigenous sector, which created a sharp divide between 
indigenous activist who supported the president and those who did not. In addition to internal 
conflicts, the indigenous movement suffered a major setback when President Gutiérrez ended 
CONAIE’s direct personnel appointments for state agencies that oversaw indigenous issues.17 
This internal division, coupled with President Gutiérrez’s political tactics, curtailed the 
indigenous movement’s influence on the presidency. The inconsequential roles Pachakutik 
and CONAIE played in the ensuing impeachment efforts revealed this reality. After the fall 
out, the indigenous movement failed to unite its supporters under the goal of removing the 
                                                 
14. Ibid., 14. 
15. "Indigenous Cabinet Members Walk Tightrope between Administration 
and Communities," South American Political and Economic Affairs February 13, 2003. 
16. Zamosc, 14.  
17. "Lucio Gutiérrez Gana Un “Round” a La Conaie," Diario El Comercio October 18, 2003. 
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president. As a result, CONAIE called off the two street manifestations it staged in 2004 
because of low turnouts; supporters who sided with Gutiérrez refused to participate in the 
protests.18 It was only after President Gutiérrez dismissed Supreme Court justices in an effort 
to exonerate previous President Abdalá Buccaram, who had been charged with corruption, that 
Quito’s middle class organized and successfully removed him from office.19 For the first time 
since 1997, the indigenous movement did not lead the street manifestations that resulted in the 
impeachment of an Ecuadorian president. 
 
                                                 
18. "President Lucio Gutiérrez Overcomes Impeachment Effort," South American Political and Economic Affairs 
Novermber 19, 2004. 
19. "Constitutional Crisis Erupts after President Lucio Gutiérrez and Parliament 
Remove Supreme Court," South American Political and Economic Affairs January 7, 2005. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE ROAD TO THE 2008 CONSTITUTION 
 
The 2006 Presidential Election 
 The previous decade of presidential overthrows defined the political landscape of the 
2006 presidential election. In the race for a new president, the indigenous movement found itself 
in a marginal political position due to its association with the Gutiérrez presidency and its 
internal fragmentation. The political instability of the time also affected Rafael Correa by 
causing him to run on an anti-establishment platform that antagonized the traditional political 
powers. In the 2006 presidential elections, the political landscape presented all of the necessary 
conditions for an electoral alliance to form between Correa and the indigenous movement. 
However, this coalition never formed, and this reality directly undermines the narrative of 
manipulation. 
The cloud of corruption and instability that haunted the Ecuadorian nation during the 
2006 election determined the political positions of Rafael Correa and the indigenous 
movement.  Despite the advancements made in the previous decade, the indigenous movement’s 
failed alliance with Lucio Gutiérrez undermined its legitimacy and curtailed its influence.  In 
2006, the effects of this manifested themselves when CONAIE attempted to organize protests 
against a pending free trade deal. The indigenous movement’s calls to action did not produce the 
same results that they once did as only a few indigenous communities participated, and the 
protests themselves were unorganized.20 The previous decade also profoundly influenced Rafael 
Correa’s political positions in the 2006 elections. The three impeachments between 1997 and 
                                                 
20. Luis Alberto and Tuaza Castro, "La Crisis Del Movimiento Indígena En Ecuador," Flasco Andes, no. 1 (2011). 
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2005 caused Correa to distance himself from the decadent government. Accordingly, he ran on 
an anti-government platform that promised the transformation of the Ecuadorian constitution, 
and with it, the government itself. By framing the creation of a new constitution as a 
transformative process that would the end the traditional domination of self-interested political 
parties, Correa began a war with congress before he ever took office. 
The instability of the Ecuadorian government further isolated Rafael Correa and 
heightened his need for political allies. As Simón Pachano revealed in “Reforma Electoral en 
Ecuador” (Electoral Reform in Ecuador), due to emergence of new social sectors, namely 
CONAIE and Pachakutik, the demands of political movements resulted in various reforms that 
focused on resolving immediate issues and did not consider the development of the political 
system itself. This weakened Ecuadorian political parties that in turn fostered hostility within the 
legislature and executive as politicians fought for their party’s existence.21 The decade of 
presidential overthrows and the political instability that followed produced a fertile ground for an 
alliance between Rafael Correa and the indigenous movement. 
The indigenous movement’s refusal to form an electoral coalition with Rafael Correa in 
the 2006 presidential election reveals the mutualistic and strategic nature of the alliance that 
eventually formed in 2007. During his presidential campaign, Correa sought to join forces with 
the indigenous movement in an effort to secure the presidency. His aggressive discourse of 
governmental reform targeted the former supporters of CONAIE and Pachakutik.22 In a 
strategic plot to ensure their electoral support, Correa met with indigenous leaders to establish 
an official coalition.23 Although Rafael Correa’s rhetoric of governmental reform won him 
                                                 
21. Simón Pachano, "Reforma Electoral En Ecuador," Reformas Politicas en América Latina  (2008): 498. 
22. Catherine Conaghan and Carlos de la Torre, "The Permanent Campaign of Rafael Correa: Making Ecuador’s 
Plebiscitary Presidency," The International Journal of Press/Politics 13, no. 3 (2008): 271. 
23. "Pachakutik Va En Alianza; Rafael Correa Es Su Primera Opción," Diario El Comercio, April 29 2006. 
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support amongst members of Pachakutik and CONAIE, it failed to sway the indigenous 
movement into officially supporting his campaign. On May 22, 2006, COANIE and 
Pachakutik, in a united front, ended the possibility of an electoral coalition by nominating Luis 
Macas as their presidential candidate.24 In an interview with Diario El Comercio, indigenous 
leaders cited their unwillingness to compromise the integrity of their indigenous campaign and 
their mistrust of Correa’s intentions as the determining factors of their decision.25 
The indigenous movement’s public mistrust of Rafael Correa and its refusal to enter an 
alliance with him severely undermines the narrative of manipulation. In a manipulative 
relationship, the deceiver must successfully secure the trust of the deceived. Rafael Correa 
failed to do this, and more importantly, he failed to convince the indigenous movement to 
support his campaign. By framing this failure within the political landscape of the 2006 
presidential election, the narrative of manipulation that casts a shadow over this period falls to 
shambles. The platform Correa ran on echoed the demands indigenous movement had been 
making since the Levantamiento in 1990—he called for the end of neoliberal policies, the 
incorporation of the indigenous sector and the fundamental reform of the government to end 
the traditional domination of self-interested political parties. Furthermore, the fragmented 
state the indigenous movement found itself in undermined its legitimacy and caused it to lose 
its traditional electoral support. These factors effectively eliminated any opportunity of the 
indigenous movement winning the presidency. This meant Correa’s coalition, at hindsight, 
presented an opportunity to further an indigenous agenda. But CONAIE’s and Pachakutik’s 
experience with presidential politics, specifically their failed coalition with President 
Gutiérrez, made them distrustful of Correa’s rhetoric, as they made publically known. In the 
                                                 
24. "El Nexo Pachakutik – Correa, En Manos De Ecuarunari," Diario El Comercio, May 6 2006. 
25. Ibid. 
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2006 presidential election, the rhetoric of Correa did not sway the Pachakutik and CONAIE; 
rather, the indigenous movement stood its ground and waited for a more beneficial 
opportunity to present itself—and it did in 2007. 
 
The National Referendum and the Constitutional Convention  
Despite his inability to persuade the indigenous movement into joining his coalition, 
Rafael Correa ultimately won the presidency in 2006. Upon his entrance to office, Correa 
began a war with congress by fulfilling his promise of issuing an executive decree to hold a 
constituent assembly. In an effort to eliminate his opposition, the newly elected president 
amended his decree to grant the proposed assembly “full powers”.26 If approved, this meant the 
assembly would have the unilateral ability to dissolve existing intuitions. However, before 
President Correa’s transformative plan of restructuring the Ecuadorian government could 
unfold, he needed to win the nation’s approval. This political context created another 
opportunity for an electoral coalition between Correa and the ingenious movement. 
The second phase in the relations between President Rafael Correa and the indigenous 
movement produced different results. After the election of Correa in 2006, the movement 
strategically remained close to the president and his push for a new constitution. Pachakutik 
went as far as publically supporting Correa’s decree to hold a constituent assembly with 
unilateral powers. However, not all sectors of the indigenous movement approved of the 
decision. The insignificant role the indigenous movement occupied within the Correa 
administration made CONAIE skeptical of the new administration; Mónica Chuji, a member 
                                                 
26. Conaghan and de la Torre, 271. 
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of CONAIE, was the only indigenous person in the presidential cabinet.27 27Despite Correa’s 
inclusive discourse and endorsement of plurinationalism, the indigenous movement did not 
have a direct influence on the new administration. This mistrust worsened when Correa 
proclaimed himself an indigenous person and consequently caused indigenous leaders to deem 
his support of plurinationalism and indigenous issues as mere pandering to further his own 
political agenda.28 Despite these concerns, CONAIE and Pachakutik ultimately supported 
President Correa’s push for a constituent convention. After publically endorsing the 
referendum, Pachakutik and CONAIE campaigned for its approval. Through public discourses 
and published articles, the indigenous movement framed the creation of a new constitution as 
an opportunity to incorporate indigenous demands, specifically plurinationalism.29 The 
indigenous movement’s campaigns were successful, and on September 28, with the crucial 
support of indigenous communities, the nation approved the referendum for a constituent 
assembly. 
The ratification of the referendum was a victory for both President Correa and the 
indigenous movement. The election held for the 2007 Constituent Assembly resulted in Rafael 
Correa’s political party wining eighty out of the one hundred and thirty seats in the assembly.30 
This, in addition to the full powers granted to the convention, allowed Correa to consolidate his 
power by using the constitution to reinstate the interventionist role of the state and remove his 
opposition in congress.31 In the case of the indigenous movement, the ratification of the 
referendum provided an opportunity to incorporate the demands of indigenous people into the 
                                                 
27. Alberto and Castro,  313. 
28. "Pachakutik Se Reunió Ayer Con Correa," Diario El Comercio, January 23 2007. 
29. Alberto and Castro, 313. 
30. Conaghan and de la Torre,  274. 
31. Ibid. 
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2008 Constitution. In the months leading assembly and during the assembly itself, the 
indigenous movement, primarily through Mónica Chuji, relentlessly demanded the 
incorporation of collective rights and plurinationalism into the 2008 Constitution.32 At the 
conclusion of the assembly, the voices of the indigenous movement proved effective as 
Ecuador etched plurinationalism into the nation’s new charter.33 
The indigenous movement’s role in the push for a new constitution further exhibited its 
political resourcefulness. In in 2007 and 2008 the political context did not drastically change. 
The inability for CONAIE and Pachakutik to reach a consensus on whether to support Correa’s 
push for a new constitution revealed that the indigenous movement was still in a state of 
fragmentation; and the insignificant role played in the Correa administration reflected its 
limited political influence. Nevertheless, the movement chose to form a momentary alliance to 
win the nation’s approval for a new constitution. This was a calculated maneuver as the 
election of President Correa in 2006, without the support of CONAIE and Pachakutik, made it 
clear that the referendum could pass without their endorsement. In this scenario, the 
movement’s demands for plurinationalism would not carry the same weight. Thus, President 
Correa did not court the indigenous movement—the indigenous movement chose to join his 
coalition only when it benefited it the most. As COANIE leader Humberto Cholango made 
clear, the momentary alliance with Rafael Correa served the primary purpose of ensuring that 
the indigenous movement reaped the seeds sown by those who marched before them.34 
 
  
                                                 
32. Alberto and Castro,  313. 
33. Georgetown University. 




The incorporation of plurinationalism into the 2008 Constitution is a narrative of 
opportunity. By analyzing the failed attempts to form an electoral coalition within the context 
of the 2006 election, the narrative of manipulation starts to fall apart. The decade immediately 
before the presidential election placed COANIE and Pachakutik in a marginal political 
position, but it did not rob the indigenous movement of its extensive experience with 
presidential politics; its public skepticism of Rafael Correa during the presidential election 
made this clear. By revealing this element of distrust and highlighting the timely nature of the 
alliance that did form in 2007, this thesis accurately presented the indigenous movement’s 
decision to support President Rafael Correa’s push for a new constitution as calculative and 
beneficial maneuver. 
In addition to unveiling the indigenous movement’s political savviness, the application 
of a broader historical lens also brought to light the mutualistic character of Correa-indigenous 
alliance. The tentative union formed because of opportunity—not manipulation. Despite their 
marginal political position, CONAIE and Pachakutik used their extensive experience to 
capitalize on an opportunity. The inclusion of incorporating plurinationalism in the 2008 
constitution was this opportunity. And to capitalize, the movement formed an alliance with 
Correa when it was most beneficial for it. In doing so, it transformed its disadvantaged position 
into one of power by leveraging its electoral support to ensure the inclusion of plurinationalism 
in the new constitution. This does not mean Correa’s rhetoric was honest, but that it failed to 
seduce the movement into blindly supporting him. Considering the political landscape in 2007 
17 
and the events that unfolded, it becomes unquestionably clear that a narrative of manipulation 
does not capture the nuances of this moment. 
By revealing the strategic nature of the indigenous movement’s decision to support the 
creation of a new constitution, this essay raises two new questions. First, was the indigenous 
movement's involvement in the coalition ultimately beneficial to the indigenous people of 
Ecuador? By considering the lack of concrete effects plurinationalism has produced as a 
constitutional doctrine, the answer to this question seems straightforward. However, this 
question must be analyzed with the recognition that Rafael Correa had a viable opportunity to 
win the nation's support for a new constitution without the endorsement of the indigenous 
movement. In this scenario, the possibility exists that the movement would have failed to 
secure any form of victory with the creation of a new constitution. Finally, what concrete 
outcomes did the indigenous movement expect from the establishment of plurinationalism as a 
constitutional doctrine? The indigenous movement’s profound understanding of the political 
system and its limitations, as unveiled in this essay, makes this inquiry is especially interesting.  
The story of the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution serves as a stern reminder that progress 
is a process. The injustices the indigenous movement has fought against will not disappear 
overnight. This means that the 2008 Constitution’s failure to bring about transformative change 
for the indigenous people of Ecuador does not invalidate it as an enormous victory. Therefore, 
to trivialize this accomplishment as a meaningless token diminishes the years of unwavering 
advocacy that made it possible; and perhaps more importantly, perpetuates the existence of a 
false narrative. However, these shortcomings are also important pieces to the larger story of 
plurinationalism in Ecuador that reveal that the fight is not over. In the sake of accuracy, this 
thesis thus strived to present the incorporation of plurinationalism into the 2008 Constitution in 
18 
its intricate reality to reveal how a narrative of manipulation does not capture the complexity of 
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